Explaining Unification in Physics Internally by Salimkhani, Kian
Explaining Unification in Physics Internally
Kian Salimkhani∗†
Abstract
In this paper I challenge two widespread convictions about unification
in physics: (1) unification is an aim of physics and (2) unification is driven
by metaphysical or metatheoretical presuppositions. I call these external
explanations of why there is unification in physics. Against this, I claim
that (a) unification is a by-product of physical research and (b) unification
is driven by basic methodological strategies of physics alone (without any
appeal to metaphysical or metatheoretical presuppositions). I call this
an internal (or methodological) explanation of why there is unification
in physics. To support my claims, I will investigate the actual practice
undertaken in physics in paradigmatic examples of unification.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I challenge two common convictions about unification in physics:
(1) unification is an aim (or the aim) of physics, and (2) unification is driven
by metaphysical or metatheoretical presuppositions. Against this, I claim that
(a) unification is a result—or for dialectical effect: a by-product—of physical re-
search, and (b) unification is driven by basic methodological strategies of physics
alone. In particular, I claim that unification is not driven by any appeal to meta-
physical or metatheoretical presuppositions. Accordingly, the main objective of
this paper is to answer the following questions: If we take physics as not explic-
itly aiming for unification, then how do we explain the many apparent cases of
unification in physics, i.e., why is there a unificatory practice in physics (or more
specifically: why are there certain unificatory research programmes); and, what
is the methodological ‘toolbox’ that brings about unification, if metaphysical or
metatheoretical presuppositions are not responsible?
Formally speaking (building on Salimkhani (2018)), there are two options
for responding to the first question: either we explain unification in physics
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internally or externally. An explanation is internal if it is based on the ba-
sic (or genuine) aims and methods of physics only—we may say in short: an
internal explanation is based on physical reasoning. On the other hand, an
explanation is external if it is based on additional presuppositions, aims, and
methods that cannot be considered an essential part of physics (e.g., metaphys-
ical presuppositions)—we may say in short: an external explanation is based on
general philosophical reasoning.
Take the basic (or genuine) methodology of physics to be the methodology
that is associated with (or conducive for) a minimal set of aims that physics
necessarily sets for itself and that defines the discipline. Certainly, physics is a
sufficiently directed enterprise to be expected to have such a set of aims, but
admittedly there is no consensus on what aims to include (e.g., Hu¨ttemann
(1997)). Still, with respect to physics practice I propose to take the following
two as the most parsimonious, sufficiently accepted, and central aims that need
to be accounted for in one way or another: empirical adequacy and theoret-
ical consistency. Physics is expected, first and foremost, to yield empirically
adequate theories, i.e. correctly represent the phenomena and empirical data.
Also, physical theories are expected to be sufficiently consistent to not include
contradictory statements—at least not within a particular theory. Assuming
that physics specifically aims at unification, on the other hand, is a stronger
and, hence, more controversial claim. In particular, if unification is not plainly
conceived of as an additional aim, it involves some argument regarding how
empirical adequacy is taken care of.1 In both cases, the position is more costly
than the minimal set proposed.
This being said, it is important to emphasise that I am not engaging in the
project of arguing in favour of some specific set of aims here. I do agree that
this issue is rather involved. In particular, it may be possible to do without
some versions of theoretical consistency,2 or expect theoretical consistency to
be reducible to empirical adequacy.3 Ultimately, it is not so much the aims, but
the concrete methodology that matters (see below). What I am after in this
paper is that for explaining unification in physics it is sufficient to appeal to
a ‘down-to-earth’ conception of physics that gets rid of as many controversial
aims, background assumptions (e.g., some elaborated theory of explanation),
and methods as possible: already a deflationary understanding of physics’ (in-
ternal) aims and methodological strategies is able to explain its unificatory
practice.
In summary, the internal view—which I argue for in this paper—holds that
those methodological strategies that are an essential part of doing everyday re-
search in physics (e.g., inductive generalisations or resolving theoretical incon-
1The aim of theoretical consistency is straightforwardly absorbed in the stronger aim of
unification (see also section 2), but empirical adequacy is not.
2See Crowther and Linnemann (2018).
3See Steinberger (2017) with respect to general issues of rationality: “The thought is that
any instance of my violating (NC) [the requirement to not both believe A and ¬A] is eo
ipso an instance in which my beliefs are out of whack with the evidence. For when I hold
contradictory beliefs, at least one of the beliefs must be unsupported by the evidence.” I
thank Stefan Heidl for pointing this out to me.
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sistencies) are also responsible for physics’ unificatory practice. Accordingly,
already a minimal understanding of physics’ aims and methods is headed to-
wards unification. Against this, the external view holds either that there is
a unificatory practice in physics because unification is what physics explicitly
aims for, or that attempts at unification are based on metaphysical or metathe-
oretical presuppositions (i.e., philosophical reasoning). Hence, for the external
view, unification is the (imposed) result of additionally constraining research by
assumptions that are not part of physics proper.
To argue for the external view, one would have to show that the unificatory
practice in physics hinges on certain external (e.g., metaphysical or metathe-
oretical) presuppositions or an explicit aiming for unification that is method-
ologically active. In particular, one would have to demonstrate where and how
physicists do (and need to) employ external reasoning to justify research pro-
grammes (at least with respect to their pursuit-worthiness) and to methodolog-
ically account for unification. On the contrary, to argue for the internal view,
one has to show that essential methodological strategies of physics produce a
more unified picture as a by-product. In short, explaining why and specifying
in which sense physics is about unification amounts to investigating its actual
practice. Accordingly, I will analyse paradigmatic examples of unification to
support my claims.
As philosophical debates on unification usually focus on other aspects, I
take it that the main questions of this paper are not yet sufficiently addressed
nor satisfyingly answered in the literature.4 Nevertheless, I propose to take
the following as typical philosophical explanations of the unificatory practice in
physics: (1) claiming that physics generally aims at unification (for an overview
see Hu¨ttemann (1997), for example) or other epistemic values like explanation,
with explanation being unification (drawing on Friedman (1974) and Kitcher
(1981), for example) or being supported by unification (see Salmon (1984) and
Salmon (1990)); or (2) claiming that we can identify specific metaphysical (e.g.,
‘unity of nature’) or metatheoretical (e.g., simplicity or ‘beauty’ of mathematical
representation) presuppositions that guide and drive scientific research towards
unification (e.g., Mattingly (2005) and Hossenfelder (2018); see also Cat (1998)
reviewing the history of debates on unification among physicists).
How should these explanations be classified with respect to the internal-
external distinction? First, proponents of the view that unification is an aim of
physics must argue either that the genuine methodology of physics associated
with the minimal set of aims is sufficient to achieve this additional aim or that
it is not.5 The former is compatible with the internal view proposed in this
paper. Unification is then ultimately conceived of as a redundant aim: the gen-
uine methodology that supports the indispensable aims (empirical adequacy and
4In Salimkhani (2018), I provide an analysis of unification in the context of quantum
gravity research that is in line with this paper (see also section 3.4), but do not generalise the
findings or clarify key notions such as ‘internal’ and ‘external’ unification.
5This ambiguity is usually not acknowledged in the literature and stems from the fact that
such positions typically remain silent on how (aiming at) unification is obtained methodolog-
ically.
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theoretical consistency) also brings about unification as a by-product.6 This is
the reason why heuristic readings like Kao’s (2017) are generally in accordance
with an internal understanding—although they typically do not acknowledge
the redundancy. On the contrary, denying that the minimal set of aims is suffi-
cient basically collapses into claim (2): physics proper is taken to be guided and
constrained by aiming at unification—or rather by certain additional method-
ologically active presuppositions associated with this aim.
While I accept—albeit not without criticism—that there is a certain way
of speaking about physics ‘aiming at unification’ which is generally compatible
with the internal view (and may especially fuel readings in terms of heuristics),
I contest the external version of this claim. In this sense, the paper also expli-
cates how we should understand the ‘aiming at unification’ talk so that it is in
accordance with physics practice.
Second, claiming that metaphysical or metatheoretical presuppositions guide
and drive scientific research towards unification explicitly adopts external rea-
soning: physics is taken to pursue a (specifically enriched) methodology which is
biased towards a striving for unification by including metaphysical or metathe-
oretical presuppositions (call this a ‘unificationist methodology ’). The reasoning
is that unification in physics is driven by presuppositions that arguably are not
part of physics proper; for example, unification could be driven by some meta-
physical presupposition like ‘there is unity in nature’ or ‘everything is quantum’.
Arguing that it is such additional presuppositions that bring about unification
in physics seems to imply that there is (or could be) a less unificatorily biased
way of doing physics (i.e., the basic methodology without such additional pre-
suppositions) which could not account for the unificatory practice. I will argue
that this is a misleading characterisation of how physics works.
One has to admit, however, that at first sight external explanations do seem
justified by the long history of successful and failed attempts at unification,
and by the fact that many physicists do subscribe to the view that finding a
unified theory encompassing all physical phenomena is what physics ultimately
aims at. Additionally, talk about unification is usually not merely descriptive,
but rather a normative claim regarding what physics is about and how physics
should proceed (in the future): Specific attempts at unification may fail, but
nevertheless it is the way to go. As Maudlin (1996) puts it:
Today, anyone inquiring [. . . ] into the current status of funda-
mental physical theory is virtually guaranteed to be told the fol-
lowing tale. In the first part of this century, physicists had verified
the existence of four basic physical forces [. . . ]. Passably accurate
theories of these forces individually have been developed, but those
theories do not yet demonstrate any deep connection [. . . ]. The aim
of physics is now to produce theories which unify these forces, which
show, ultimately, that there is at base only one fundamental force in
6This understanding trivialises the claim that physics aims at unification: After all, uni-
fication is reduced to the status of being the result of other aims—so why should we consider
it an aim? Why should we hold on to this ambiguous way of speaking?
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the universe [. . . ]. The first step in this program has already been
taken [. . . ] [t]he other steps, though still to be achieved, have already
been named [. . . ]. This image of the future course of physical the-
ory has become so pervasive as to rank almost as dogma. (Maudlin,
1996, 129)
According to this ‘physicist’s tale’, unification exhibits the status of a method-
ological “commitment” that “puts rather strong constraints” on physics (Maudlin,
1996, 129f). This interpretation of physics practice might raise the following
worry: physics (or rather mainstream research programmes in physics) might
be led astray by the ‘dogma of unification’ and eventually run into a dead
end, since physicists do not even consider the possibility of a disunited picture
anymore—a worry resembling Wolfgang Pauli’s verdict on Einstein’s unified
field theory: “What God put apart, no one shall unify.”7 I intend to assuage
such worries by demonstrating that, in fact, unification is obtained indirectly
by essential parts of the physics methodology, rendering unification a natural
consequence of doing physics.
As mentioned, one might also argue (without appeal to metaphysics) that
unification should be understood as a heuristic strategy for guiding theory
development—based on the meta-inductive observation that it previously had
proven worthwhile to explore directions of research that are assumed to exhibit
a unifying power. Kao (2017) can be taken to present such a position.8
It strikes me that both readings Maudlin’s physicist’s tale and Kao’s heuris-
tics miss important insights in how theory development in physics is obtained
methodologically. Moreover, without any need, such readings pave the way for
criticism similar to, for example, Hossenfelder (2018). In short, there is more to
learn.
As a science, modern physics subsumes the diversity of singular events un-
der general laws of nature. To allow for this, physics arguably needs to employ
some fundamental assumptions about its subject matter, but unification (of
these laws of nature), so I claim, does not depend on any additional metaphys-
ical or metatheoretical presuppositions that are not already implicit in genuine
physics strategies themselves. It is not the case that we forcefully try to unify
what God put apart. Rather, whenever we try to understand a limited do-
main we are pushed beyond its boundaries. In the course of physical research
the concrete objects of research that physicists are concerned with contingently
prove to exhibit surprisingly substantial links to other objects of research as
7My translation of “Was Gott getrennt hat, soll der Mensch nicht vereinen” (Treder, 1983).
8I do not argue against Kao’s proposal, as I take her reading of unification playing some
role in heuristics to be weak enough to be compatible with what I try to put forward in this
paper. In fact, I agree with Kao on what physicists are actually concerned with (essentially also
diminishing the alleged heuristic role of unification): “[. . . ] indeed, it does not even seem to be
the case that finding an overarching theory was the primary motivation to work in the various
domains. [. . . ] it is worth noting that this is the opposite of what we might think would be
the case if the goal were, for instance, to find unifying theories because unifying explanations
are a crucial characteristic of theories. Instead, it seems that the primary motivation was to
solve existing problems in each scientific domain” (Kao, 2017). My project is that of taking
this insight seriously.
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a matter of fact. So, we may say that the objects of research do ‘effectively’
turn out to fit together in a manner rather similar to jigsaw pieces. But to say
this is not to presuppose the unity of nature.9 Hence, the claim is that even
something as speculative as the quest for a theory of quantum gravity (QG)
should be understood as the result of an immanent analysis of our theoretically
most advanced and experimentally best-tested framework (see section 3.4), not
as a striving for unification simpliciter. Accordingly, unification results as an
epiphenomenon, a by-product, of exploiting genuine scientific methods. Philos-
ophy should not obscure this important characteristic of physics by the usual
talk about the alleged striving for unification.
In the following, after a few general remarks on unification, the internal-
external distinction is carved out in section 2. Afterwards, the practice of uni-
fication is explored in more detail with respect to four instructive examples in
section 3 to support my claims. I conclude by briefly revisiting the resulting
perspective on unification in section 4, adding some comments on how these
findings can be useful for metaphysics.
2 Mapping Concepts of Unification
Usually, talk about unification in physics is not about unifying language or ter-
minology, but something more substantial like ‘unifying different laws of nature’
(which means something like ‘generalising or subsuming the respective laws into
some superordinated theory in a meaningful way’). For example, Galileo’s and
Kepler’s laws are ‘unified’ in Newton’s universal law of gravitation, because
Newton’s law comprises and explains Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws. This is a
tentative explication of how unification reduces plurality and reveals a typi-
cally unforeseen affinity between its objects. But what are the exact criteria for
calling something ‘unification’?
Trying to pin down such criteria, Maudlin (1996) distinguishes different lev-
els with respect to their strength (with only the highest level amounting to
unification).10 Maudlin argues that the following conditions are important but
insufficient for saying that two laws of nature are ‘unified’: mere ‘consistency’,
sharing a ‘common explanatory structure’, and exhibiting some ‘nomic connec-
tion’. “The fact that a theory of embryonic development does not contradict
a theory of the formation of the rings of Saturn” does not render the two uni-
fied (Maudlin, 1996, 130), neither does a common explanatory structure that
does not put any constraint on the explanantia (Maudlin, 1996, 131). A the-
ory that combines Newton’s law of gravitation and Coulomb’s law of electricity,
for example, offers a common explanatory structure for electricity and gravi-
9As a position which refrains from metaphysical presuppositions in explaining the ten-
dency towards unification, the internal perspective starts neither from a unitist’s (e.g., von
Weizsa¨cker (1980)) nor from a disunitist’s (e.g., Cartwright (1999)) view—insisting on either
‘unity’ or ‘disunity’ in nature. Still, ultimately, we may favour one view over the other by
help of inference to the best explanation (see also section 4).
10I shall assume that Maudlin’s general picture is accepted albeit it with minor qualifica-
tions (see, for example, Morrison (2000), and Rickles and French (2006)).
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tation, but since “the forces are not postulated to have anything in particular
to do with one another” this is not ‘unifying’ gravity and electricity (Maudlin,
1996, 131). Instead, Maudlin insists that the notion of unification requires that
ontological entities or structures are unified. This is why electromagnetism in
special relativity (SR) exemplifies the strongest case for Maudlin: Here, the elec-
tric and magnetic fields are no longer fundamental entities of the theory, but
are “replaced by” some underlying structure represented by the electromagnetic
field tensor (Maudlin, 1996, 131-133). So, the highest level, i.e., unification, is
obtained when previously independent entities (or structures) are reduced to a
single entity (or structure) in the new theory.
Overall, I agree with Maudlin’s classification; this paper, however, is focused
on another issue, namely investigating the methodological aspects in the process
of unification (that is the process of climbing Maudlin’s conceptual ladder start-
ing from the diversity of the phenomena and ending—maybe—in ontological
unification). This objective entails that conceptual analysis cannot do the job,
but the actual practice of physics and its methodological ‘toolbox’ (or ‘mecha-
nism’) need to be investigated. For this, I propose to map different concepts of
unification by asking two questions: (1) What is the object of unification?; and,
(2) How does unification work methodologically?
The first question seems easy to answer. There are three levels (or dimen-
sions) of unification: (1.1) We can obtain a phenomenological (or nomological)
unification at the level of phenomenological laws of nature like Kepler’s laws.
Here, a variety of phenomena is nomologically unified by some law of nature.
(1.2) Unification can be about (already existing) theoretical structure, e.g. phys-
ical theories. Call this theoretical unification. (1.3) We can obtain unification at
the level of ontology, i.e., ontological unification, where ontic entities or struc-
tures are unified. For example, in the case of SR the electric and magnetic
fields are unified to the electromagnetic field. Note that while unifying ontology
generally requires theoretical and phenomenological unification, the opposite is
not true. So, the strength of the unification obtained is understood to increase
from (1.1) to (1.3).
Concerning the second question on how unification is actually worked out,
I propose to distinguish five methodological strategies that physics regularly
employs and that bring about a unificatory impact (as will be further discussed
when considering the case studies in the next section): (2.1) inductive generali-
sation from phenomena to (phenomenological) laws of nature including lessons
from new empirical evidence, (2.2) eliminating theoretical misrepresentation of
the observable phenomena (e.g., artifacts like frame dependence) due to, for
example, symmetry considerations, (2.3) resolving anomalies and inconsisten-
cies within a theoretical framework, (2.4) identifying (causal) mechanisms, and
(2.5) fully exploiting the explanatory resources of an established theory and
expanding the realm of an established theory from within (second order gener-
alisation). These strategies are internal in the sense that they are genuine to
physics—that is strategies (2.1) to (2.5) constitute an essential and basic part
of everyday physics research with its minimal set of aims—and do not appeal
to metaphysical or metatheoretical (i.e., external) reasoning.
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To construct (or find) laws of nature as inductive generalisations is widely
agreed to be a genuine and basic part of physics. Inductive generalisations
are at the very basis of physics, and hence in some sense the starting point of
unification, but they neither refer directly to unification (as mentioned above,
the standard for calling something ‘unification’ is typically higher), nor to (e.g.,
metaphysics-laden) considerations external to physics.11 But what about the
other strategies? Do they refer directly to unification or to considerations ex-
ternal to physics? Do they involve some sort of metaphysical presupposition?
As I will argue in more detail in the next sections, this is not the case. (2.2)
merely involves a proper evaluation of the phenomena’s representation in the-
ory (e.g., regarding symmetry properties, where symmetry considerations sim-
ply account for the phenomena’s independence of observational or theoretical
artifacts); (2.3) appeals to the fundamental demand that theories need to be log-
ically (or mathematically) consistent, but does not presuppose anything about
the comprehensiveness of the theory; (2.4) is a paradigmatical method of physics
that does not involve any claim regarding the unity of such mechanisms; and
(2.5) is an outstanding example of an internal unificatory practice as it simply
comprises taking an empirically established theory seriously, fully exploiting it,
and pushing it to its (alleged) limits by its own means (until anomalies arise)—
certainly, it is a genuine part of physics research to work out the details of its
theories and check whether something has to give.
For further clarification, let me list two conceivable strategies that are—on
their own—not genuine to physics, but refer to external reasoning: given two
theories, (2.6) identifying a common (mathematical) structure or reducing one
to the other, and (2.7) identifying a common ontology or reducing one to the
other. Employing method (2.6) can be understood as enforcing the purely for-
mal demand of mathematical simplicity on physics that merely reorganises the
laws in a more ‘simple’ way (without additional explanatory insights). Moreover,
(2.7)—if not a result of internal strategies—explicitly relies on philosophical con-
siderations and does not seem to be a genuine physical method at all (physicists
are typically not concerned with ontological questions in everyday research).12
11For a more detailed discussion see also section 3.1.
12One might object as follows: Why not say that ontological unification is a theoretical
desideratum in physics? Since physical theories should be about the world, they should be
about ontology. Ontological considerations would then, pace my own argument, be internal to
physics: Often, genuine physical arguments just are arguments for ontological unification—I
thank Isaac Wilhelm for raising this point. I think there are three issues here. First, I do not
disagree that genuine physical arguments can result in ontological unification. I am arguing
that this does not imply that ontological considerations are themselves part of the genuine
methodology of physics. Second, I take it that most physicists (and philosophers thinking that
physics is about empirical adequacy, for example) would not be on board with saying that
ontological considerations are part of physics. Physics certainly is about the world, but it is
specifically about the empirical (observable) aspects of the world. Third, whether ontological
considerations are internal to physics or not is irrelevant with respect to the question of how
to explain the unificatory practice: Claiming that ontological considerations are internal to
physics is not sufficient to account for ontological unification. Being about ontology is not
synonymous with being about a unified ontology. The real job (to answer why ontological
considerations lead to a unified ontology) still remains to be done. For this we can again either
appeal to external, i.e., philosophical reasons, or try to spell out internally why unification
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As already mentioned, some do think that physics employs externally justified
strategies (see also section 3.4).
Note that these strategies are not isolated, but may overlap or work together.
For example, an analysis according to (2.1) inductive generalisation or (2.2)
eliminating misrepresentation can result in ontological unification. Also, I do
not conceive the list of methodological strategies to be exhaustive or fixed, but
as allowing for additional nuances. Furthermore, while (2.1) refers exclusively
to (1.1), phenomenological unification, the other strategies might in principle
account for unification at all three levels.
We can now identify the two concepts of unification, already mentioned, that
are linked to a specific way of explaining why there is a unificatory practice in
physics: The internal view holds that physics’ genuine methodological strate-
gies, (2.1) to (2.5), designed to uncover, exploit, and expand the explanatory
resources of a given theory as far as possible, are sufficient to obtain unification
at all three levels, (1.1) to (1.3), as a by-product of physics research. Because of
its internal unificatory impact, we should not be surprised that genuine physics
methodology on its own already implies a unificatory practice. Such a view nei-
ther draws on metaphysical or metatheoretical considerations, nor on explicitly
aiming at unification. Accordingly, unification arises in physics.13
On the other hand, the external view argues either that we pursue unifica-
tion for its own sake (or as being instrumental for promoting other epistemic
values, like explanation14 for example), or that we pursue unification based on
metaphysical or metatheoretical presuppositions. At the heart of both lies a
unificationist methodology that executes the external demands that drive the
striving for unification; strategies (2.6) and (2.7) may serve as examples of how
physics’ genuine methodology could be extended in the direction of a unifica-
tionist methodology. According to the external view, unification is imposed on
physics. Hence, unification is a result of additionally constraining research by
assumptions external to physics proper. The reasoning essentially works as fol-
lows: ‘Due to some metaphysical or metatheoretical presupposition we know
that physics should pursue unification. Therefore, we try to find (and should
prefer) common theoretical and ontic structures to construct unified theories.’
For instance, the way Maudlin presents the physicist’s tale as a quest for (1.3) a
unified ontology of the fundamental interactions suggests that physics pursues
an externally justified unificationist methodology by explicitly trying to (2.7)
is the result of genuine physical arguments. This is precisely what I put forward from the
outset: Often, genuine physical arguments turn out to promote ontological unification (as a
by-product).
13At first sight, Maudlin (1996) seems to endorse an internal view when he argues that it
is possible to identify empirical or theoretical evidence suggesting unification in many cases.
However, Maudlin’s conviction that physics is commited to unification as “the aim of physical
theory” (Maudlin, 1996, 129f), his presentation of the physicist’s tale, and his interpretation of
certain case studies (see section 3.2, for example) are incompatible with the internal perspec-
tive I advocate in this paper and rather point to a position that views physics as constrained
and guided externally.
14In this paper I shall remain neutral on the issue of whether there is any conceptual link
between unification and explanation. In general, I conceive my position on unification as
compatible with views on which physics aims at explanation or truth.
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identify a common ontology. Proponents of this view emphasise that physicists
are—and should be—dissatisfied with any kind of patchwork in physics (e.g.,
two completely disconnected theories for different interactions) for the respec-
tive reasons. Critics take this practice as de facto existing but misguided, and
the reasons as physically dubious.
This paper argues against both perspectives: there is no such practice of
imposition, but still unification is obtained. We should not interpret physics
practice in line with the external view, because it obfuscates how theory devel-
opment is actually driven and justified in physics, namely by concrete physical
reasons. Remarks by physicists on their intentions or motivations should not be
taken too seriously. Instead of evaluating what physicists say, I propose to look
at what they actually do.
3 Four Case Studies From Physics
To support my claim that the practice of unification in physics does not rely on
metaphysical or metatheoretical presuppositions imposed on physics, but is best
explained by the genuine methodological practice of physics intended to uncover
and exploit the explanatory resources of a given theory by promoting internal
theoretical progress, I will now investigate four paradigmatic case studies.
3.1 Newton’s Universal Law of Gravitation
The historically first substantial example of unification in physics is Newton’s
universal law of gravitation which famously unified the terrestrial and celestial
mechanics of Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws. Equally famously, Newton was aware
of and explicit about the metaphysical foundations and consequences. So, does
this provide an instance where unification was driven by metaphysical reasoning?
Reading Ducheyne (2005), for example, it would seem so. Ducheyne argues
that we can identify two types of unification in Newton’s work. The first type
of unification is established by identifying causal mechanisms, while the sec-
ond refers to inductive generalisations. Ducheyne specifies that the first type
“is based on the premise that nature maintains the same modus operandi as
much as possible”, whereas the second “is based on the premise that nature is
contiguous” (Ducheyne, 2005, 77). Regarding the first type of unification,
[. . . ] Newton infers from the observation that Kepler’s second
and third law hold for the primary and secondary planets that these
motions are caused by inverse-square centripetal forces. [. . . ] New-
ton concludes that since these phenomena are of the same kind they
depend on causes of the same kind [. . . ]. (Ducheyne, 2005, 74)
Ducheyne goes on to argue that after Newton has identified gravity as the
common cause for planetary motion, “a deep belief in the contiguity of na-
ture” (Ducheyne, 2005, 74) fuels the subsequent development towards his uni-
versal law of gravitation.
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We could understand this as follows: There are two metaphysical assump-
tions in Newton’s work. On the one hand, nature is assumed to ‘maintain the
same modus operandi ’, on the other hand, nature is assumed to be ‘contiguous’.
Unification is then obtained by help of these assumptions. For example, unifi-
cation by means of method (2.4)—identifying causal mechanisms—is based on
the metaphysical assumption that nature ‘maintains the same modus operandi ’,
i.e. the same effects have the same cause. Unification would then depend on
imposing metaphysical assumptions, just as the external view has it.
Against this, I propose to take the assumption that the same effects have the
same cause as a general methodological (not a metaphysical) point about how
inductive generalisation needs to be approached. If all the empirical facts about
some set of phenomena suggest that they are (empirically) ‘of the same kind’,
then science needs to take this seriously. Similarly, ‘having the same cause’ is
just the best explanation for ‘having the same effect’. If all facts speak in favour
of uniformity and generalisability, it would seem dubious, if science still tried to
keep things apart and told an elaborate story of why ‘what is really going on’
is more complex than the phenomena reveal.15 In brief, there are good internal
reasons for developing a more unified description, and they do not commit us
to any substantial metaphysical claim.
But even a stronger reading that accepts Newton’s assumptions as meta-
physical (i.e., as assumptions about the world, not about physics’ methodol-
ogy), does not entail that the external view is correct. This is because both
assumptions do not selectively guide and drive the specific endeavour of unifi-
cation (e.g., unification of two already established laws of nature), but are of
concern in a more fundamental way: they are part of what allows us to engage
in science (or inductive generalisation) in the first place. In this sense I agree
that, for example, ‘same effect, same cause’ is a credo paradigmatically internal
to physics.16 Some “order in the world” (Mumford and Tugby, 2013, 11) just
has to be assumed; if you wish you may take this as an almost transcendental
argument on the conditions of doing science per se (e.g., Mumford and Tugby
(2013)). Obviously, this does have some impact in terms of initiating unification,
but it does not imply that physics additionally employs metaphysical reasoning
in order to specifically account for unification.
Let me also argue in more detail why the contiguousness assumption should
count as internal to physics: I propose to read this assumption as an example of
internally promoting a continuity from one theory (or phenomenological realm)
to another allegedly disconnected theory (or phenomenological realm)—in the
sense that a theory is taken seriously and then pushed to its limits by its own
means as far as feasible. To demonstrate the continuity between terrestrial and
celestial mechanics (which hitherto had been thought to be strictly separated
realms), Newton brings up the following thought experiment in his The System
of the World (see Newton (1846)):17 Suppose we are on a high mountain and
15See also the discussion of Einstein’s dissatisfaction with Maxwell’s theory of electromag-
netism in the next section.
16I thank Isaac Wilhelm for pressing me on this.
17Note that the ‘Moon-test’ (Principia, Book III, Proposition IV) provides a more precise,
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drop a stone so that the stone freely falls to the ground. This is described by
Galileo’s terrestrial mechanics. Now, suppose we do not let the stone fall, but
throw it. Terrestrial mechanics tells us that the stone will move on a parabolic
trajectory. When we increase the velocity (parallel to the earth’s surface) with
which the stone is projected, the stone goes farther and farther. At some point
the velocity is high enough to keep the stone from falling. The stone is now
orbiting the earth just as a satellite is according to Kepler’s laws. By means of
taking seriously the theoretical framework and realm of Galileian physics and
literally pushing it to its limits (the stone orbiting is obtained as a limiting
procedure of ballistic trajectories), we end up in the framework of Kepler, sug-
gesting an underlying unified description of both; and, in particular, suggesting
an underlying mechanism or common cause. Thus, Newton’s unification of ce-
lestial and terrestrial mechanics is best explained by the internal unificatory
impact of physics’ genuine methods and can be classified as unification at all
three levels (phenomena, theoretical structure, and ontology) by means of a
mixture of the different internal strategies of physics.
Before we move on, let me point out that Newton’s unification is at least
slightly different from the following examples as it is heavily concerned with
an analysis of the phenomena, whereas the following examples will more and
more prominently involve theoretical considerations. We may attribute this to
the fact that the different examples have different points of departure regarding
the already obtained level of unification. This may also explain why, as dis-
cussed, Newton’s rules of reasoning more directly touch on fundamental aspects
of scientific methodology than the following examples do.
3.2 Electromagnetism in Special Relativity
According to my scheme, Maxwell’s theory exemplifies the phenomenological
and theoretical unification of electricity and magnetism. In SR this is pushed
further to ontological unification by eliminating electric and magnetic fields
from the ontology and replacing them with the electromagnetic field. But which
practice of unification was at play here? Maudlin argues that Einstein identified
the lack of ontological unification in Maxwell’s theory as defective and explicitly
aimed at unifying electricity and magnetism. He interprets Einstein’s appraisal
of the moving magnet and conductor problem as straightforwardly concerned
with unification:
[. . . ] the failure of classical electromagnetic theory to unify elec-
tric and magnetic phenomena was the leading complaint voiced in
Einstein’s “special relativity” paper. (Maudlin, 1996, 131)
Thus, it seems that the transition from Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism to
quantitative argument based on empirical data for the fact that “the force by which the moon
is retained in its orbit is that very same force which we commonly call gravity; for, were gravity
another force different from that, then bodies descending to the earth with the joint impulse
of both forces would fall with a double velocity [. . . ]; altogether against experience” (Newton,
1846).
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SR is best explained by a unificationist methodology. Yet, in fact, “the failure
to unify” was not Einstein’s complaint. Reading Maudlin, one could come away
with the impression that Einstein had no physical reasons to be dissatisfied with
Maxwell’s theory, but took a unified ontology to be better for other reasons ex-
ternal to physics. Reading Einstein, however, we find that he was tackling a
concrete physical problem and obtained unification as the result of a genuine
physical argument. Exploiting his principle of relativity, Einstein noticed that
“Maxwell’s electrodynamics [. . . ] when applied to moving bodies, leads to asym-
metries which do not appear to be inherent in the phenomena” (Einstein (1952)
in Maudlin (1996)). The same phenomena generated by the same observable
current in the conductor are interpreted differently (inconsistently) in Maxwell’s
theory: the charges in the conductor experience either a magnetic or an electric
force depending on which frame of reference is chosen (the magnet frame or the
conductor frame, respectively). Thus, the actual phenomenon is misrepresented
in Maxwell’s theory:
The observable phenomenon here depends only on the relative
motion of the conductor and the magnet, whereas the customary
view draws a sharp distinction between the two cases in which either
one or the other of these bodies is in motion. (Einstein (1952) in
Maudlin (1996))
So, Maxwell’s theory artificially distinguishes two cases for one and the same ob-
servable phenomenon (due to frame-dependent artifacts). Einstein argues that
either there is a physical explanation of the asymmetries present in Maxwell’s
theory (that may also be tested empirically), or the theory suffers from frame-
dependent artifacts (without observable consequences) hinting at some under-
lying structure that is invariant under change of reference frames. Through
analysing Maxwell’s theory, identifying misrepresentations of phenomena, and
eliminating them in SR, Einstein arrived at an empirically more adequate de-
scription and thereby obtained unification. Why consider this to be a case of
‘aiming at unification’ when it was about attacking a theoretical misrepresen-
tation of a phenomenon? Just because unification was the result? For Einstein,
Maxwell’s theory was not defective due to a failure of unification, but due to the
fact that Maxwell’s theory did not consistently explain the phenomena: specifi-
cally, it did not explain why the physical situation should be different when we
change the reference frame (the underlying reason for this inconsistency being
that the forces present transform differently than the fields giving rise to these
forces). This is important to emphasise: it is a concrete physical problem (the
moving magnet and conductor problem) that raises these questions, not ideas
about how Newtonian and Maxwellian physics or electric and magnetic fields
have to be unified. In other words, there is something to learn physically, which
then promotes theoretical progress. The resulting unification was not based on
any reference to external (metaphysical or metatheoretical) arguments, but was
obtained by means of methods like (2.2) analysing and eliminating theoretical
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misrepresentation of the observable phenomena.18
There are certainly more instances of unification concerning SR. For ex-
ample, joining space and time to obtain ‘spacetime’ is again a mere—though
significant—by-product of getting the symmetry group right. But instead of
investigating SR more thoroughly, let me now turn to a more controversial ex-
ample from particle physics.
3.3 Electroweak Theory and Grand Unified Theories
As the physicist’s tale illustrates, many are convinced that physics, among other
things, tries to unify the three Standard Model (SM) interactions (electromag-
netic, weak, and strong). Sheldon Glashow, Abdus Salam, and Steven Weinberg
managed to accomplish the first step by presenting a unified theory for electro-
magnetism and the weak interaction. However, electroweak theory is usually not
understood as exhibiting ontological unification, but rather seems to approach
unification as an issue of formal simplicity without explanatory benefit (see
Morrison (2000)). Furthermore, all attempts at grand unified theories (GUTs)
which encompass all three SM interactions failed. Naturally, the suspicion arises
that unification is not being pursued for internal reasons of physics here, but
to meet external criteria. This is why studying the cases of electroweak theory
and GUTs is interesting for my objective. It turns out that, for example, to for-
mulate a consistent and empirically adequate theory of the weak interaction in
the first place, we needed to include the electromagnetic interaction (Maudlin,
1996, 138). So, unification was the (surprising) result of constructing a theory
encompassing the phenomena of the weak interaction. I will get back to this
in a moment, but let us approach the matter step by step. First of all, what
does ‘unifying interactions of the SM’ mean? Let me briefly recall how these
interactions are represented in theory.
The quantum field theories (QFTs) of the SM are so-called gauge theories. In
short, the SM interactions are represented by gauge fields that arise according to
the group generators of some underlying symmetry group. So, a gauge theory is
essentially defined by its symmetry group. Unifying interactions then amounts
to group-theoretic operations. Basically there are three different types.
First of all, two (or more) symmetry groups can be ‘glued’ together to form
a so-called product group. The product group is a trivial mathematical com-
bination of different groups, which can always be constructed. The SM is put
together like this: the symmetry groups of the electromagnetic, U(1), the weak,
SU(2), and the strong interaction, SU(3), are merged by a trivial mathematical
operation: SU(3)×SU(2)×U(1). In Maudlin’s terms “this is a case of common
dynamics and nothing more” (Maudlin, 1996, 137). It “does not constitute any
18Let me briefly comment on a worry that was similarly raised to me by Andreas Hu¨ttemann
and Isaac Wilhelm. One could ask: what is so bad about an imperfect representation? What
is so bad about having symmetric explananda, but asymmetric explanantia? Implicit in the
question is the suggestion that ‘aiming at unification’ is the answer. I do not see how aiming
at a correct representation of phenomena involves ideas on unification. In some cases it may
imply unification as a result; but this is not what I am arguing against, but arguing for.
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sort of unification of the theories at all” (Maudlin, 1996, 139). We do not learn
anything above and beyond what we already knew. However, second, unifica-
tion by means of a product group may reveal additional structure. Consider, for
example, electroweak theory. The unified gauge group is just the product group
SU(2)×U(1), but a nontrivial mixing between the generators of the symmetry
groups occurs when combined to form the product group. Hence, the combi-
nation seems to be less superficial. Third, gauge theories can be unified by
combining symmetry groups into a so-called simple group. This is not a trivial
mathematical operation. One cannot simply join some groups to form a simple
group. At least regarding mathematical structure, unification via some simple
group is more substantial than via a product group. Physically, there are also
differences. For example, an adequate choice for a simple group unifying the
SM usually involves additional physically relevant structure. So we might argue
that we have physical reasons to pursue such proposals. Consider, for example,
SU(5) ⊃ SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1) as an approach to GUTs. All such attempts
at GUTs have failed due to the lack of empirical adequacy. Most prominently,
GUTs predict a half-life for proton decay that is empirically excluded.
What drives these attempts at unification? Is it unification for the sake
of formal simplicity? For electroweak theory we find this not to be the case.
Rather, electroweak theory was not intended to be an attempt at unification at
all. While we can write down a theory of electromagnetism alone, as obtained
with quantum electrodynamics, we cannot write down a theory of the weak
interaction only:19
No workable theory of the weak force existed before the uni-
fied theory [. . . ] Incidentally, this is one way in which the usual
story about unifying forces is wrong. It is not that at some point
we had theories of the electromagnetic, weak, strong, and gravita-
tional forces separately, and now we have managed to unify the first
two. Rather, at some point we recognized the existence of all four
forces, and found that unification was needed to account for the
weak force. (Maudlin, 1996, 141)
So, electroweak theory was obtained as a by-product of constructing an em-
pirically adequate theory of the weak interaction, and hence proves to be an
example of physics’ internal unificatory practice; notably, although it is typi-
cally argued that “the unification is partial at best” (Georgi in Maudlin (1996)):
electroweak theory neither uncovers a causal mechanism, nor provides ontolog-
ical unification, nor exhibits any particular explanatory power beyond merely
accounting for the weak force, but solely unifies mathematical structure (cf.
Georgi in Maudlin (1996), and Morrison (2000)). In my scheme, electroweak
19Let me stress that, strictly speaking, this presentation adopted from Maudlin (1996) is
somewhat imprecise: we did know not only some phenomenological details about the weak
interaction, but also already had some effective theoretical modelling; I thank Se´bastien Rivat
for reminding me of this. Still, it is correct to say that electroweak unification was not
about unifying two equally accepted and well-behaved theories. A sensible theory of the weak
interaction was not worked out yet.
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theory is therefore classified as unification of types (1.1) and (1.2), namely con-
cerning phenomena and theoretical structure, by means of different internal
strategies of physics, this being some mixture of types (2.1) to (2.5).
What about GUTs? Here, the problem seems to be different. We already
have a worked out theory for the strong interaction: quantum chromodynam-
ics. Why unify two already existing theories? It might seem we can only make
sense out of this research programme by referring to external reasoning or at
least have to acknowledge that this direction of research was pursued for heuris-
tical reasons. However, a closer look reveals that GUTs were not considered
for purely heuristical, but for internal physical reasons. Due to the mathemat-
ical structure of these theories, physicists anticipated that GUTs would yield
additional information for electroweak theory with higher explanatory power:
The motivation for the simplest GUT, SU(5), was not any mys-
tical desire to follow in Einstein’s footsteps and unify everything.
Shelley Glashow and I were just trying to understand SU(2)×U(1)
better. For several years, we had realized that if we could incorpo-
rate the SU(2)×U(1) gauge symmetry into a single simple group it
would give us some extra information. It would fix the value of the
weak mixing angle, a free parameter in the SU(2)×U(1) theory and
it would explain why all the electric charges we see in the world are
multiples of the charge of the electron. (Georgi in Maudlin (1996))
Generally, such models are not analysed out of “mystical desires” for ontolog-
ical unity or for the sake of formal simplicity, but to better understand the
explanatory features and problems of an already established theory—by means
of strategies (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5). Yet, bewilderingly, Maudlin summarises
Georgi’s comment—similar to how he read Einstein’s comment on Maxwell’s
theory—by invoking what Georgi explicitly rejected: “these considerations all
stem from the desire to complete the only partially unified SU(2)×U(1) theory
in a more satisfactory way” (Maudlin, 1996, 142). This underlines that Maudlin
is not concerned with distinguishing whether unification is driven by internal or
external reasoning.
3.4 Quantum Gravity
Such talk about physicists aiming at unification for (allegedly) physically dubi-
ous reasons is especially common and problematic when it comes to attempts
at the frontier of physical research. Here, we often do not have much data to
back new theoretical developments. Take QG, for example, which is usually
presented as the quest to unify general relativity (GR) and QM (or QFT).20
When it comes to QG—the most prominent and most controversial case of uni-
fication in modern physics—we do not have any clear-cut, novel experimental
or observational data at all. Additionally, the research programme of QG faces
serious theoretical problems. According to folklore, this is because GR and QFT
20In fact, there is no consensus on what exactly the quest is.
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seem to exhibit a “fundamental incompatibility” (Maudlin, 1996, 143). So, why
unify?
Most physicists and philosophers argue that there are many physical reasons
to expect an underlying theory due to phenomena where both, GR and QFT, are
understood to become relevant—among those are problems within the standard
model of cosmology, black holes, and consistency issues in QFT (e.g., Kiefer
(2007)). Overall, these issues are taken to indicate some sort of incompleteness
of present-day physics and trigger theoretical progress. Accordingly, the reason
to pursue a theory of QG is to solve these genuinely physical issues—evidently
an internal enterprise.
Critics, however, disagree and argue that there is in fact no compelling
physical reason at all to pursue these research programmes—neither experimen-
tal, nor theoretical. Naturally, they advocate the disunitist’s position of semi-
classical theories (e.g., Mattingly (2005)). In the past, or so they argue, physics
may have profited from (what they now consider a dubious) striving for unifica-
tion, but modern research programmes like QG are misguided in their (alleged)
commitment to unification. So have we finally encountered an example where
unification is indeed driven by “purely aesthetic reasons”, or “on the general
methodological grounds of repeating strategies that succeeded in the past”—
arguments Maudlin already dismissed for GUTs as not convincing (Maudlin,
1996, 141)?
In fact, also philosophers and physicists who generally accept the need for a
theory of QG frequently mention ‘aiming at unification’ or a ‘desire for unifica-
tion’ as an additional reason (e.g., Kiefer (2007), Wu¨thrich (2005), and Crowther
(2018)), and raise similar concerns—at least regarding the motivation to pursue
specific approaches, e.g. in the context of particle physics (e.g., Hossenfelder
(2018)). For instance, Wu¨thrich argues that
A strong, but nevertheless often nebulous, desire to present a
unified theoretical framework at the level of fundamental physics
populates the folklore of physicists and often fuels the search for
a quantum theory of gravity. Arguments to this effect, relying—if
made explicit at all—on metaphysical considerations, typically elicit
some principles of unity of nature or of scientific method. Although
general relativity and quantum theory may be so disparate as to
disallow the formal deduction of contradictions, they are generally
taken to be incommensurable (families of) theories. A quantum the-
ory of gravity is expected to remedy this theoretical schism and to
bolster attempts at finding the Holy Grail of physics, a unified frame-
work of all interactions. The argument from unification—unification
for the sake of unification—does not, however, sway the sceptic. The
“disunitist” would certainly be free to respond that at the very least,
it may just as well be the case that the conceptual disunity of the
two theories reflects a disunity in nature. In fact, she could claim,
gravity’s stubborn refusal to be subsumed under the otherwise all-
encompassing umbrella of the Standard Model may be interpreted
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as evidence for this disunity. Despite its rare explicit articulation
and its questionable metaphysical strength, however, the unificatory
impetus provides an extremely important motivation for attempts
at quantizing gravity. (Wu¨thrich, 2005, 788)
Pushing Wu¨thrich’s worry further, Mattingly (2005) is convinced that “im-
plicit as well as explicit philosophical motivations” and “meta-theoretical com-
mitments of some kind” drive the research programme. In order to support his
claim, Mattingly refers to the following statement by Carlo Rovelli:
We have learned from GR that spacetime is a dynamical field
among others, obeying dynamical equations, and having indepen-
dent degrees of freedom: a gravitational wave is extremely similar
to an electromagnetic wave. We have learned from QM that every
dynamical object has quantum properties, which can be captured
by appropriately formulating its dynamical theory within the gen-
eral scheme of QM. Therefore, spacetime itself must exhibit quan-
tum properties. Its properties—including the metrical properties it
defines—must be represented in quantum mechanical terms. Notice
that the strength of this “therefore” derives from the confidence we
have in the two theories, QM and GR. (Rovelli, 2001)
Does this reveal that Rovelli uses “some kind of thesis about the unity of na-
ture” and that “an important meta-theoretical impetus for quantising gravity
follows from notions of unification”, as Mattingly (2005) argues? Rovelli’s ver-
dict regarding the ‘extreme similarity’ and its relevance arguably does seem
to express some metaphysical presupposition, but had better be read as being
about comparing the theoretical concepts of two theories, and then drawing
conclusions about the world. Accordingly, some (metaphysically more modest)
story in line with Kao (2017) better accounts for what is going on here. Still,
Rovelli’s statement on the lessons from QM begs the question, because the level
of generality (“every dynamical object”) is chosen with respect to the desired
(rhetorical) argument in favour of unification. So, on the face of it, the critics
seem to have a point.
However, philosophy should not get distracted by programmatic remarks.
What is crucial is an evaluation of the actual practice of physics. Due to the
multitude of different approaches this cannot be done exhaustively for all QG
research programmes in this paper. Instead I will focus on a particular class of
approaches in the context of particle physics and string theory that is—in line
with the physicist’s tale—often thought to be specifically about a striving for
unification.21 In the following, I will argue that we can make Rovelli’s remarks
more precise in this context and thereby rebut the critics who do not accept the
mentioned physical reasons to engage in the research programme of QG. This
is done by emphasising the substantive insights from QFT.
21Alternative approaches to QG usually have a rather different and less comprehensive
objective. Loop quantum gravity (LQG), for example, is merely concerned with a quantum
theory of (empty) spacetime.
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As argued in Salimkhani (2018)—summarising the standard view of particle
physics on this issue based on the work of Weinberg and others—a close analysis
of the framework of QFT delivers an effective theory of quantum gravity that
is empirically adequate, but has specific theoretical problems that need to be
resolved. In particular, Lorentz-invariant interactions with massless spin-2 par-
ticles require the equivalence principle to hold at low energies (e.g., Weinberg
(1995)) which results in a low-energy theory of quantum gravity that has GR as
its unique classical limit—this is a working theory of QG. However, the theory
becomes inconsistent in the most interesting regime, namely at high energies
(the infamous renormalisation problem).22 Not only does QFT provide us with
a first working theory of QG, but also shows that we need to go beyond. Note
also that GR is of no concern—we may actually assume that we did not know
about GR. As a result, the issue of QG is not to unify two theories of allegedly
separate realms (GR and QFT), but to fix internal issues of QFT, i.e. to find
the correct high-energy theory.
In a first step, Weinberg’s argumentation establishes a theory of QG. This is
“an example of physics’ internal capacity to promote theoretical progress by fully
exploiting an existing theoretical framework and thereby uncovering substan-
tial links to allegedly disconnected phenomena and theoretical structures” (Sal-
imkhani, 2018), i.e., strategy (2.5). Taking the best theoretical framework se-
riously, and analysing it thoroughly, results in a low-energy theory of QG. In
a second step, we then find that QFT does not provide a meaningful theory of
gravity at high energies. This is the remaining problem of QG that needs to
be resolved for purely internal reasons (namely for reasons of consistency of our
best theory: QFT). This amounts to pursuing strategy (2.3). In fact, closely
related live approaches like asymptotic safety and string theory (e.g., Weinberg
(1999) and Dawid (2013)) are the result of such an analysis of QFT, and may
also help to better understand QFT.23
4 Unification revisited
Let us now briefly retrace our steps. We started by observing that over time the
theories of physics have become more and more unified, and that this calls for
an explanation. We noticed that unification being the ultimate aim of physics
(or being instrumental for other epistemic values) is what many would accept
as an explanation, although it is unclear what exactly this implies methodolog-
ically. Furthermore, for some (e.g., Mattingly (2005) and Hossenfelder (2018))
the genuine methodology of physics, a tendency towards unified theories in the
past, and previous success of certain heuristic strategies are not able to jus-
tify present research programmes—be it in principle or as a matter of fact. In
22Let me add that I am not suggesting that a theory is ‘correct’ if and only if it is UV-
complete. Crowther and Linnemann (2018) nicely evaluate this issue.
23Note that the internal-external distinction may also be used to classify approaches as more
or less promising. Considering the amount of disagreement between the different approaches
to QG it should come as no surprise if certain approaches eventually become viewed as poorly
justified.
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this perspective, especially certain research programmes at the frontier which
(if successful) promise unification as one of their key features look suspiciously
like a misguided striving for unification—in the specific sense that physicists
either naively try to repeat previous successes or start from metaphysical or
metatheoretical presuppositions which turn out to severely constrain (and po-
tentially mislead) their research. The critics’ view, in short, is that unification
is ‘imposed’ on physics (for external and potentially dubious reasons).
Against this, I emphasised that a more rigorous study of the actual practice
of unification in physics reveals that unification arises from genuine methods
of physics alone. Unification does not depend on metaphysical presuppositions,
but is the result of good scientific practice. Unification is best explained by a
certain set of basic methods used in everyday physics. More specifically, unifica-
tion is best explained by the practice of taking a concept or a theory seriously,
thoroughly working out its details, pushing it to its limits, and thereby gain-
ing new knowledge.24 This is the ‘best’ explanation because it explains the
unificatory practice from within physics (without assuming additional or con-
troversial aims and methods). Furthermore, the opposing position (1) would
have to say how exactly physics methodologically incorporates the alleged ex-
ternal constraints (either this will involve implausible statements like ‘physics
is directly concerned with working out a minimal ontology’ or it effectively
collapses into my proposal), (2) cannot provide any explanatory benefit which
could justify their additional metaphysical assumptions, and (3) obfuscates the
actual practice of physics.
In this respect, my project is that of reducing the share of metaphysical (or
metatheoretical) presuppositions in explaining actual practice in physics. Note
that my project is not that of arguing against any metaphysical basis (or formal
constraints) for scientific endeavours: the position I propose does still allow for
physics making fundamental assumptions about its objects, in the sense that
physics may have to assume that the objects are well-behaved enough to be
objects of physical research in the first place. Regarding unification, however,
metaphysics is not what we start with but where we end up: it is the (inductive)
result of physics (depending on it and being continuous with it). So even if those
methods I take to be genuine to physics are not metaphysically thin but loaded
with some basic (metaphysical) assumptions, we are still better off not viewing
unification as driven by metaphysical or metatheoretical presuppositions. Note
that we may say that the basic assumptions actually do the work, but this is
still different from what Wu¨thrich (2005) and Mattingly (2005) put forward, for
example.
There is another important aspect to my presentation: Arguing that uni-
fication will come out as a result of proper research implies a certain sense of
necessity. Within a particular line of thought (concept or theory), the tendency
towards a more unified picture is inevitable—at least up to the point where
24This is not only characteristic of physics, but of mathematics as well. Consider the
example of number theory where exploiting the notion of ‘number’ further and further (‘pushed
to its limits’) ultimately provided substantial links to other areas of mathematics. I thank
Andreas Bartels for this.
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the concept or theory breaks down and is not useful anymore. This view is
to be distinguished from, for example, a ‘best systematisation’ view that can
only make sense of unification in terms of a strong and explicit dependence on
external considerations regarding simplicity, for example.
Apart from lessons in general philosophy of science, this is an interesting
result for metaphysics as well, especially for programmes that employ abduc-
tive reasoning. So, let me briefly comment on how arguing that unification in
physics does not depend on metaphysical or metatheoretical presuppositions
may be exploited further for attacking the selection problem in inductive (and
in naturalised) metaphysics, for example.
First, let me clarify that by inductive metaphysics (IM) I do not refer to
the historical programme of Becher and others, but a recent approach to meta-
physics similar to Williamson (2016), for example. Modern IM asserts a specific
methodological continuity between science and metaphysics. It holds that (in-
ductive) metaphysical inferences should not only meet scientific facts, but (a)
employ scientific facts as (empirical) premises and (b) proceed in accordance
with scientific methodology by using, for example, inferences to the best expla-
nation. As a result, metaphysical generalisation is proposed to be not categori-
cally different from science, but rather to collapse into (more general) scientific
generalisation. In particular, metaphysical theories are taken to be contingent
(in the sense that they depend on certain scientific theories). Also, note that
IM takes seriously that we should not read off metaphysical commitments from
a particular scientific theory alone—as naturalised metaphysics may be charged
with—but also consider available alternative theories (or alternative interpreta-
tions, for that matter).
Now, since the ontological commitments of the respective theories may differ
substantially (e.g., see the approaches to QG), it seems that we cannot hope
for a unique determination of any positive metaphysical inference unless we
ultimately appeal to what is usually referred to as ‘a priori reasoning’ by help of
assumptions like simplicity or unification (cf. Paul (2012)). Otherwise, we might
only be able to carve out a ‘common ground’ as a merely negative constraint
on metaphysics. In fact, IM does not generally oppose such elements of a priori
reasoning, precisely for the reason that it wants to be able to further constrain
inductive metaphysical inferences. However, one may argue that IM is rendered
unoriginal by taking this ‘loophole’.
It is here where an internal understanding of unification is relevant for in-
ductive metaphysics in two respects. First, the internal view explicates how
inductive methods of physics bring about decisions for ontology not only by un-
derlining some continuity between everyday physical research and metaphysics,
but also by proposing that metaphysics itself should be understood inductively.
Second, showing that unification is internal in the sense presented provides a
cure to the mentioned problems in metaphysics in terms of a selection rule for
choosing which scientific theories should be considered relevant for (inductive)
metaphysical inferences: namely, choose the theories that are ‘best’ with re-
spect to unification. An internal conception of unification can thus help to
diminish worries about using such criteria, since it better meets IM’s general
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line of thought than the canonical (external) take on unification. Accordingly,
we may employ unification as a positive constraint to inform IM about which
physical theories to consider without this meaning that IM is forced to embrace
a priori reasoning after all.
Besides this, one could also straightforwardly argue that the described prac-
tice of physics allows for the following (inductive) metaphysical inference: there
actually is a unity in nature (at least to a certain extent) because physics in-
ternally obtains unification (at least to a certain extent) as a result of inductive
scientific reasoning.25
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